Court of Appeals of New York - Polito v. Walsh by Pike, William
Touro Law Review 
Volume 24 Number 2 Article 10 
May 2014 
Court of Appeals of New York - Polito v. Walsh 
William Pike 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Criminal Law Commons, and the Criminal Procedure 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Pike, William (2014) "Court of Appeals of New York - Polito v. Walsh," Touro Law Review: Vol. 24 : No. 2 , 
Article 10. 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol24/iss2/10 
This Double Jeopardy is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Touro Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center. 
For more information, please contact lross@tourolaw.edu. 
Court of Appeals of New York - Polito v. Walsh 
Cover Page Footnote 
24-2 
This double jeopardy is available in Touro Law Review: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol24/iss2/
10 
COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK
Polito v. Walsh'
(decided June 28, 2007)
Carmine Polito and Mario Fortunato were convicted in federal
court of murder in aid of racketeering.2 On appeal, both convictions
were reversed and the cases dismissed because the government failed
to prove the requisite predicate racketeering acts.3 A New York
grand jury subsequently indicted both men on state murder charges
stemming from the same activity upon which the racketeering con-
viction had been based.4 The defendants challenged the state's effort
to prosecute them, claiming the second prosecution was for the same
crime. The defendants did not rely on the United States Constitution
5
nor the New York Constitution,6 both of which forbid double jeop-
ardy.7 Rather, the defendants invoked New York's statutory protec-
tion against double jeopardy,8 and sought a writ of prohibition to stop
the proceedings for violations of section 40.20(1) of the Criminal
' 871 N.E.2d 537 (N.Y. 2007).
2 Polito, 871 N.E.2d at 537.
3 United States v. Bruno, 383 F.3d 65, 86 (2d Cir. 2004).
4 Polito, 871 N.E.2d at 538.
5 U.S. CONST. amend. V states, in relevant part: "[N]or shall any person be subject for the
same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life of limb ...."
6 N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 6 states, in relevant part: "No person shall be subject to be twice
put in jeopardy for the same offense ......
7 Double jeopardy is "[t]he fact of being prosecuted or sentenced twice for substantially
the same offense." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 528 (8th ed. 2004).
8 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 40.20(1) (McKinney 2006) states: "A person may not be
twice prosecuted for the same offense."
1
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Procedure Law ("CPL").9 The New York Court of Appeals ruled in
favor of the prosecution and held the state prosecution could proceed
because it did not fall within the double jeopardy prohibition the stat-
ute proscribes.l°
In federal court, the defendants were tried and convicted of
committing violent crimes in aid of racketeering activity I I for alleg-
edly murdering Sabatino Lombardi and attempting to murder Michael
D'Urso "for the purpose of gaining entrance to and maintaining and
increasing position" in racketeering activity. 12 At trial, the prosecu-
tion portrayed a stormy relationship between the victims and the al-
leged murder suspects. 3 Evidence showed D'Urso, on numerous oc-
casions, spurred by offensive remarks, had physically attacked
Fortunato. 4  Additionally, evidence showed Lombardi, a reputed
member of the Genovese crime family, had once attempted to stop
Polito from associating with the Bonnano crime family, a move met
with indignation.' 5 Finally, there was evidence presented that Polito
asked his cousin to kill D'Urso and Lombardi. 16  Ultimately, both
9 Polito, 871 N.E.2d at 538.
I0 d. at 541.
Polito, 871 N.E.2d at 537. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1959(a) (West 2007) which states, in
relevant part:
Whoever, as consideration for the receipt of, or as consideration for a
promise or agreement to pay, anything of pecuniary value from an enter-
prise engaged in racketeering activity, or for the purpose of gaining en-
trance to or maintaining or increasing position in an enterprise engaged
in racketeering activity, murders ... or attempts or conspires so to do,
shall be punished.
12 Polito, 871 N.E.2d at 538 (quoting 18 U.S.C.A. § 1959(a)).
13 Bruno, 383 F.3d at 72-74.
14 Id. at 72-73.
" Id. at 72, 74.
16 Id. at 74.
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men were shot-Lombardi fatally. 17 The United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit reversed the defendants' convictions,
holding it was an improper application of the statute because the
shooting was not in furtherance of the alleged racketeering activity,
but instead out of "personal hatred and to avoid the repayment of
gambling debts.' 8 On June 13, 2005, the defendants were indicted
on state murder charges, based on the same activity for which their
murder in aid of racketeering conviction was overturned. 9 The de-
fendants responded by filing an Article 7820 petition with the appel-
late division, seeking to prevent the state from proceeding with the
murder prosecution through a writ of prohibition.21 After being de-
nied relief from the Second Department, the defendants were granted
leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals.22
The defendants did not argue that the United States Constitu-
tion prohibited successive prosecutions in state and federal court for
the same conduct, and they did not specifically claim that the New
York State Constitution's double jeopardy clause23 was violated.24
'7 Id. at 74-75.
18 Polito, 871 N.E.2d at 537. See Bruno, 383 F.3d at 85.
19 Polito, 871 N.E.2d at 538. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25(1) (McKinney 2006) ("A
person is guilty of murder in the second degree when: 1. With intent to cause the death of
another person, he causes the death of such person or of a third person ... ").
20 Article 78 allows a plaintiff to request an appellate court to review the authority of an
officer attempting to enforce an order of certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition. See N.Y.
C.P.L.R. 7801 (McKinney 2007).
21 Polito, 871 N.E.2d at 538. See Polito v. Walsh, 823 N.Y.S.2d 92 (App. Div. 2d Dep't
2006).
22 Polito, 871 N.E.2d at 538. See Polito v. Walsh, 860 N.E.2d 991 (N.Y. 2006).
23 See N.Y. CONST. art 1, § 6. See also Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 787 (1969)
(holding the constitutional guarantee of the Fifth Amendment is applicable to the States
through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
24 Polito, 871 N.E.2d at 538. See Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 139 n.30 (1959) (hold-
ing that the Fourteenth Amendment does not prohibit successive federal and state prosecu-
2008]
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Instead, the defendants argued New York's double jeopardy statute
affords them protection from subsequent prosecution for the murder
of Lombardi and D'Urso because they were already tried for murder
under the federal racketeering statute.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the appellate division's denial
of the writ of prohibition, holding the defendants' contention that the
prosecution was barred by section 40.20 of the CPL was without
26merit. The court held that section 40.20(1) does not reject the dual
sovereignty doctrine, which permits successive state and federal
prosecutions, and overruled several previous cases indicating other-
wise.2' The court explained that any protection in addition to that
provided by either the state or federal constitutions is provided by
section 40.20(2) of the CPL.28 However, the court held that section
40.20(2) expressly denied protection under the circumstances pre-
sented by the defendants, and, as a result, it rejected the defendant's
appeal of the denial of the writ.29
New York implements its state constitutional prohibition on
double jeopardy through section 40.20 of the CPL, which contains
two parts.30  The second subdivision states "a person may not be
separately prosecuted for two [separate] offenses based upon the
tions for the same conduct). Bartkus is discussed more thoroughly later in this piece.
25 Polito, 871 N.E.2d at 538. See 18 U.S.C.A. 1959(a).
26 Polito, 871 N.E.2d at 538, 541. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 40.20.
27 Polito, 871 N.E.2d at 541 ("We now conclude that [Booth, Rivera, and Abraham] re-
quire clarification, if not correction."). See Booth v. Clary, 635 N.E.2d 279 (N.Y. 1994);
People v. Rivera, 456 N.E.2d 492 (N.Y. 1983); Abraham v. Justices of N.Y. Sup. Ct. Bronx
County, 338 N.E.2d 597 (N.Y. 1975).
28 Polito, 871 N.E.2d at 541; N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 40.20(2).
29 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 40.20(2); Polito, 871 N.E.2d at 541.
30 See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 40.20(1), (2).
[Vol. 24
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same act or criminal transaction unless" one of eight exceptions ap-
plied.3' The sixth exception directly applied to the Polito case.32 The
defendants were charged with a violation committed in another juris-
diction,33 convicted in that same jurisdiction, and that conviction was
terminated by a federal appeals court's order "expressly founded
upon insufficiency of evidence to establish some element of aid of
racketeering which is not an element of murder., 34  The defense,
however, did not base their appeal on this subdivision.35
The first subdivision of the statute contains similar language
to that of the United States Constitution. It states "[a] person may not
be twice prosecuted for the same offense. 36 The defendants argued
the court's statutory interpretation of the term "same offense" was too
narrow, and contrary to legislative intent. 37 Furthermore, the defen-
dants asserted that the Fifth Amendment and section 40.20 contain an
identical phrase: "same offense., 38 They claimed that the authors of
the statute could not have intended to give less protection than the
31 See id. at § 40.20(2) (setting forth the eight exceptions to the rule contained in subdivi-
sion one).
32 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 40.20(2)(f) states:
One of the offenses consists of a violation of a statutory provision of an-
other jurisdiction, which offense has been prosecuted in such other juris-
diction and has there been terminated by a court order expressly founded
upon insufficiency of evidence to establish some element of such offense
which is not an element of the other offense, defined by the laws of this
state.
33 Bruno, 383 F.3d at 71.
34 Polito, 871 N.E.2d at 539.
35 Id.
36 U.S. CONST. amend. V; N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 40.20(1).
37 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 40.10(1) (McKinney 2006) ("An 'offense' is committed
whenever any conduct is performed which violates a statutory provision defining an offense;
and when the same conduct or criminal transaction violates two or more such statutory pro-
visions each such violation constitutes a separate and distinct offense."); Polito, 871 N.E.2d
at 540.
38 U.S. CONST. amend V.; N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 40.20(1); Polito, 871 N.E.2d at 540.
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United States Constitution, and the words "same offense" should be
interpreted in accordance with the Blockburger test.39 Under this in-
terpretation, the defendants argued, double jeopardy would preclude
the second prosecution.
4 °
In Blockburger v. United States, the defendant delivered the
prescription drug morphine hydrochloride to a purchaser in a tam-
pered package. At the rendezvous, the purchaser paid for an addi-
tional amount which was delivered the next day.42 The defendant
was convicted on three of five counts contained in the indictment
stemming from both days' transactions; 43 each resulted in a separate
five-year prison sentence, and the defendant appealed, arguing the
multiple convictions were for one offense.44 The Supreme Court held
that when a separate provision of a statute requires proof of an addi-
tional fact that the other does not, there is more than one offense for
which the defendant may be convicted.45 Using what has become
known as the Blockburger test, the Court held that because additional
facts were required to prove each statutory violation, more than one
offense was committed by the defendant.46
In Bartkus v. Illinois, the United States Supreme Court held
3 Polito, 871 N.E.2d at 540. See Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
40 Polito, 871 N.E.2d, at 540.
41 Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 301.
42 Id.
43 Under the federal statute, the defendant was convicted for the sale of drugs not in its
original packaging on two separate occasions, and for the sale of drugs not made pursuant to
written order. Id.; 26 U.S.C.A. § 692 (West 2003).
44 Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 300-01. The defendant claimed that failure to sell drugs in its
original packaging and failure to sell drugs without written prescription, although both are
violations under different subdivisions of the same statute, only constituted one offense. Id.
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that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution did
not bar successive prosecutions for the same conduct in federal and
state court.4 7 This has become known as the dual sovereignty doc-
trine.48 In Bartkus, the defendant was tried and acquitted in a federal
district court for robbing a federally insured savings and loan associa-
tion.49 However, one month after the defendant was acquitted in fed-
eral court, he was indicted in an Illinois state court for the same
criminal activity where he was subsequently tried, convicted, and
sentenced to life imprisonment.50 The defendant appealed, claiming
that he was previously acquitted in federal court, and therefore the
subsequent prosecution in state court was barred by the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause.51 The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the decision and
the Supreme Court granted certiorari.52 The Court affirmed, holding
that a subsequent prosecution in state court, after acquittal in federal
court, does not deprive a defendant of due process of law.53
In Grady v. Corbin,54 Thomas Corbin's automobile veered
into oncoming traffic, striking two other cars, killing a woman and
injuring her husband.55 The defendant was issued two traffic tickets
and subsequently pleaded guilty to both in a town court where the
presiding judge was unaware of the ongoing criminal investigation
47 Bartkus, 359 U.S. at 138.
48 See Polito, 871 N.E.2d at 538 (citing Bartkus, 359 U.S. at 132-33).
4' Bartkus, 359 U.S. at 121-22.
50 Id. at 122.
51 Id.
52 Id.
" Id. at 139.
14 495 U.S. 508 (1990).
55 Grady, 495 U.S. at 508.
2008]
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into the fatal crash.5 6 Later, the defendant was indicted for his in-
volvement in the car crash and sought a writ of prohibition claiming
his right against double jeopardy prohibited the subsequent prosecu-
tion.57 The Court held that the prosecution could not proceed because
the government would have to prove conduct for which the defendant
had already been prosecuted to establish essential elements of the
charges in the indictment, which would unconstitutionally place the
defendant in jeopardy twice for the same offense. 58 The Grady hold-
ing required courts to look first at whether a second prosecution
passes the Blockburger test, and, if so, then whether it passes the
"same conduct test" before determining if separate offenses were
committed and a second prosecution was permissible. 59
The issue before the Court in United States v. Dixon60 was
whether subsequent criminal charges were barred by the Double
Jeopardy Clause after a defendant had previously been held in con-
tempt of court for conduct at issue because it violated a condition of
his pre-trial release from jail in an unrelated matter.6' Dixon was ini-
tially arrested for second degree murder and released on bond with
56 Id.
51 Id. at 514.
58 Id. at 514-15. The charges in the indictment were reckless manslaughter, two counts of
second degree vehicular manslaughter, criminally negligent homicide, third degree reckless
assault, and two counts of driving while intoxicated. Corbin v. Hillery, 543 N.E.2d 714, 716
(N.Y. 1989).
59 This test was originally suggested in Illinois v. Vitale ten years earlier. See Vitale, 447
U.S. 410, 419-20 (1980).
60 509 U.S. 688 (1993).
61 Dixon, 509 U.S. at 691-94. This case was a consolidation of two cases comprised of
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certain conditions.6 2 Before the murder trial began, Dixon was re-
arrested and indicted for felony cocaine charges: a clear violation of
his conditional release. 63 At the hearing to address the alleged viola-
tion, the defendant was held in contempt of court for possessing co-
caine and sentenced to 180 days in jail.64 Subsequently, the defen-
dant filed a motion to dismiss the cocaine charges on double jeopardy
grounds because he had already been convicted of contempt of court
for possessing the same cocaine.65 The Dixon Court held that the
second prosecution would violate double jeopardy and expressly
overruled Grady, and held the Blockburger test was the exclusive test
to be used when analyzing whether the "same offense" has been
committed for double jeopardy purposes.66
Before the Court of Appeals in People v. Biggs67 was a defen-
dant who allegedly shot and killed two people and was tried for mur-
der under alternate theories of intentional murder and depraved indif-
ference murder.68 At trial, the defendant was acquitted of intentional
murder after the court found that there was insufficient evidence on
that charge. The jury also acquitted him of depraved indifference
62 Id. at 691. The relevant portion of Dixon's conditional release was "that he was not to
commit any criminal offense." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
63 Id.
6' Id. at 691-92.
65 Id. at 692.
66 Dixon, 509 U.S. at 704. The second prosecution would not be impermissible under
Blockburger because the condition on the defendant was that he not be charged with a crime.
See supra note 62. By punishing him for possessing cocaine, the court was imposing pun-
ishment not for an act that specifically violated a condition of his release, but rather for an
act that violated the penal code incorporated by reference into the court order. Dixon, 509
U.S. at 697-98. The defendant could only be held in contempt because his conduct violated
that statute, and so a prosecution would therefore punish him twice for the same offense. Id.
at 711.
67 803 N.E.2d 370 (N.Y. 2003).
68 Biggs, 803 N.E.2d at 371.
2008]
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murder, but was unable to reach a verdict on the lesser offense of
reckless [second degree] manslaughter. 69  Subsequently, the defen-
dant was indicted on first and second degree manslaughter charges
for the same activity and appealed after being convicted of first de-
gree manslaughter at a second trial. 70 The court considered whether
the charges on which the defendant was convicted should have been
dismissed due to double jeopardy preclusion based on the previous
acquittal for intentional murder.7' The court held that the two were
the "same offense" under the federal Blockburger test, because to
commit intentional murder in the second degree, one must have the
intent to kill, and therefore that same person must have the intent to
seriously physically injure another person during the same act. 72 Un-
der the Blockburger test, a subsequent conviction was barred as there
was no further proof of facts necessary to sustain a conviction for in-
tentional manslaughter when the prosecution had already attempted
to prove the greater offense of intentional murder. 3
In Biggs, the defendant wanted the court to apply CPL section
40.20, not the federal Blockburger test.74 However, in New York, to
69 Id. The Court of Appeals made the determination that the trial court's withdrawal of
the intentional murder charges from the jury constituted an acquittal for double jeopardy
purposes. Id.
70 Id. at 372. The defendant was not convicted of reckless manslaughter because the jury
was instructed to only consider that charge if they acquitted the defendant of intentional
manslaughter.
71 Id. at 371. The court, for purposes of analysis, examined the statutory elements re-
quired to commit murder in the second degree and manslaughter in the first degree. Id. at
373 n. 1. Murder in the second degree requires the intent to cause death and actual causation
of the death of another. Id. First degree manslaughter does not require intent to kill, but
merely to cause serious physical injury, but where death nevertheless results. Id.
72 Id.
" Biggs, 803 N.E.2d at 374.
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invoke CPL section 40.20, the defendant must preserve the right to
do so at trial.75 While a defendant's constitutional double jeopardy
claim need not be preserved at trial, if a defendant fails to assert his
statutory claim at the trial stage, as was the case in Biggs, that right is
unpreserved and lost for appellate review, and the defendant may
only attain a reversal on constitutional double jeopardy grounds.76
Therefore, the court used Blockburger as its criterion, not section
40.20 of the CPL.77
Earlier, in People v. Lo Cicero,78 three defendants were tried
and acquitted in federal court for allegedly hijacking a truck of im-
ported goods. 79 Before their federal trial began, the state brought
charges against them for the same conduct in question. 8' After ac-
quittal in federal court, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the
state charges claiming double jeopardy precluded a subsequent trial. 81
The People argued that federal and state governments may punish a
defendant for the same act if a law has been violated in both jurisdic-
tions.82  The state court rejected this argument, relying on then-
current statutory provisions, and held that a second prosecution in
state court was barred after an acquittal in a federal court.83 Lo
7' Biggs, 803 N.E.2d at 374. "A statutory claim that one may not be separately prosecuted
for two offenses based on the same act or criminal transaction ... must be duly preserved if
there is to be appellate review." Id. (quoting People v. Dodson, 396 N.E.2d 194, 195 (N.Y.
1979)) (alteration in original).
76 Biggs, 803 N.E.2d at 374.
77 Id.
78 200 N.E.2d 622 (N.Y. 1964).
79 Lo Cicero, 200 N.E.2d at 623.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Id. at 623-24 (citing Bartkus, 359 U.S. at 121).
83 Lo Cicero, 200 N.E.2d at 624.
2008]
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Cicero essentially rejected the dual sovereignty doctrine and was a
clear sign that New York intended to afford greater double jeopardy
protection than that which the United States Constitution requires.
This decision has had a profound effect on many cases, but, accord-
ing to Polito, it required clarification or correction to accurately re-
flect the relationship between New York's statutory double jeopardy
protections and the United States Constitution's dual sovereignty
doctrine. 84
Later, in People v. Rivera, the defendant was tried on several
charges alleging he beat a man with metal pipes until the victim was
injured so severely that he fell into a coma.85 At trial, the defendant
was acquitted of intentional assault but convicted of reckless endan-
germent in the first degree.86 Four years later, the victim succumbed
to his injuries and died, and the defendant was indicted again, this
time for depraved indifference murder.87 The defendant moved to
dismiss the indictment claiming that double jeopardy barred a subse-
quent prosecution.88 The People rebutted this contention by citing
section 40.20(2)(d) 89 of the CPL, arguing it was created for the spe-
84 Polito, 871 N.E.2d at 541.
85 Rivera, 456 N.E.2d at 494.
86 Id. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.25 (McKinney 2004) which states: "A person is guilty
of reckless endangerment in the first degree when, under circumstances evincing a depraved
indifference to human life, he recklessly engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of
death to another person."
87 Rivera, 456 N.E.2d at 494. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25(2) which states, in relevant
part: "A person is guilty of murder in the second degree when ... [u]nder circumstances
evincing a depraved indifference to human life ... causes the death of another person."
88 Rivera, 456 N.E.2d at 494.
89 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 40.20(2)(d) provides, in relevant part:
A person may not be separately prosecuted for two offenses based upon
the same act or criminal transaction unless ... [o]ne of the offenses is ..
. some other offense resulting in physical injury to a person, and the
314 [Vol. 24
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cific purpose of narrowing New York's broad double jeopardy statu-
tory provision.9 ° The court held that the second trial was not pre-
cluded because under subdivision (2)(d), the second offense falls
within the exception. 91 Therefore, in application, the defendant was
originally prosecuted for reckless endangerment resulting in physical
harm, but the victim's death completed the commission of a separate
offense.92
Finally, in Klein v. Murtagh,93 the defendants were tried, con-
victed, had their convictions reversed on appeal, and were subse-
quently acquitted at a retrial in federal court for allegedly violating
the Federal Travel Act.94 The men then were indicted in state court
for conduct arising out of the same activity and argued subsequent
prosecution would violate their state and federal constitutional rights,
which is impermissible under section 40.20 of the CPL.95 It was
clear to the court, however, that the offenses the defendants were be-
ing prosecuted for were not the "same offense" under section 40.10.96
As the court explained, when section 40.20 is read alone, there are
situations where a defendant may have less protection than the United
States Constitution affords, but when read in conjunction with subdi-
vision two and section 40.10, the statutory provision confers more
other offense is one of homicide based upon the death of such person
from the same physical injury, and such death occurs after a prosecution
for the... other non-homicide offense.
90 Rivera, 456 N.E.2d at 494-95 (citing Abraham, 338 N.E.2d at 597).
91 Rivera, 456 N.E.2d at 497.
92 Id.
9' 355 N.Y.S.2d 622 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1974), aff'd, 318 N.E.2d 606 (N.Y. 1974).
14 Klein, 355 N.Y.S.2d at 624. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1952 (West 2002).
95 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 40.20; Klein, 355 N.Y.S.2d at 625.
96 Klein, 355 N.Y.S.2d at 625.
2008] 315
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protection than what is required.97 Therefore, the subsequent prose-
cution in state court was not in violation of the United States Consti-
tution. 98
In Polito, the defendants argued for the New York Court of
Appeals to apply the Blockburger test because, under Blockburger,
the defense contended that the subsequent prosecution for murder
would be prohibited.99 Accordingly, it was argued that, because the
federal prosecution required proof of every element required by the
state murder statute, jeopardy had attached, precluding proof of addi-
tional facts to convict the defendants for the separate crime of murder
in state court.100 The defense conceded that during the federal trial,
the prosecution was required to prove the elements for "aid of racket-
eering," and New York's murder statute does not require proof of any
of those elements.01 However, because all elements of murder were
proven during the federal trial, no additional facts would be required
to convict the defendants of murder in state court.10 2 The defense
also claimed that the trial court's narrow interpretation of "same of-
fense" under the New York statute was incorrect because it confers
less protection than the Fifth Amendment interpretation of "offense"
under the Blockburger test.1
0 3
When interpreting the term "same offense" in section 40.10, it
appears clear that the language requires a narrower interpretation than
9' Id. at 628.
9' Id. at 630.
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that of Blockburger.10 4 Under the Blockburger test, to prove there
was only a single offense, the defendant must merely prove that one
statutory provision requires proof of a fact the other does not. On the
other hand, under section 40.10, a defendant must overcome a much
higher hurdle, because the prosecution must merely prove a defen-
dant's conduct violated more than one statutory provision. °5 The
Polito defendants claimed that when applying New York's statutory
provision to the facts presented, the double jeopardy analysis articu-
lated in Blockburger controlled because the statute was not intended
to confer less protection than the United States Constitution.
10 6
However, the Polito defendants urged the court to find section
40.10(1), when read in conjunction with section 40.20(1), conferred
less protection than the state or federal constitutions, without even
considering section 40.20(2). l07 The People countered that any con-
stitutional deficiency presented by such an interpretation of section
40.10(1) and section 40.20(1) would be overcome by the provisions
of section 40.20(2).108 The court held that section 40.20(2) was di-
rectly applicable to the defendant's case and clearly permitted the
prosecution they challenged.'0 9 In resting their denial of the defen-
dant's writ of prohibition on the second prong of section 40.20, the
court left the merits of the parties' constitutional double jeopardy
104 See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 40.10(1); Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304.
105 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 40.10(1); Polito, 871 N.E.2d at 540.
106 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 40.10(1); Polito, 871 N.E.2d at 540.
107 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 40.10(1), 40.20(2); Polito, 871 N.E.2d at 539.
'o' Polito, 871 N.E.2d at 540.
109 Id. at 541.
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contentions to be considered in the future." 0 Furthermore, to suc-
ceed, the defendants had the burden of persuading the Court of Ap-
peals not only that section CPL 40.10(1) requires use of the federal
Blockburger standard, but additionally that the statute rejects the dual
sovereignty doctrine."'
Faced with the apparent ambiguity and difficulty inherent in
interpreting the phrase "same offense," many courts, judges, and
scholars have formulated their own innovative approaches in attempt-
ing to create a test more susceptible to congruent application.
12
These tests often seem more rational than the Blockburger approach.
In Richardson v. State,113 for example, the defendant was convicted
of robbery and battery for conduct arising out of a single incident
where several men stopped on a bridge, beat another man, and subse-
quently kicked him over the edge of the bridge. 114 First, the court
analyzed the alleged statutory violations and concluded that there was
no double jeopardy violation because the subsequent statutory viola-
tion required proof of an additional fact for which the other did not." 5
That analysis however, is only half of the test. Additionally, the
court looked at the "actual evidence" test and examined whether the
facts of the second trial could have been determined by the facts
110 Id.
... Id. at 538, 541 (holding that the defendants were unable to meet either of these conten-
tions).
112 See, e.g., Anne Bowen Poulin, Double Jeopardy Protection From Successive Prosecu-
tion: A Proposed Approach, 92 GEO. L.J. 1183 (2004); George C. Thomas III, A Modest
Proposal to Save the Double Jeopardy Clause, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 195 (1991).
"' 717 N.E.2d 32 (Ind. 1999).
114 Richardson, 717 N.E.2d at 54.
"5 Id. at 52.
318 [Vol. 24
16
Touro Law Review, Vol. 24 [2008], No. 2, Art. 10
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol24/iss2/10
DOUBLE JEOPARDY
shown at the first trial. 1 6 To prevail, the defendant must prove there
is "a reasonable possibility that the evidentiary facts used by the fact-
finder to establish the essential elements of one offense may also
have been used to establish the essential elements of a second chal-
lenged offense."'"17  The court held, contrary to the Blockburger
analysis, there was only one offense under the "actual evidence"
test. 8 The court reasoned there was only one offense because there
was a reasonable possibility that the evidentiary facts which the jury
would use to establish the first offense would be used to establish the
essential elements of the second offense." 9 In Polito, the defendants
did not ask the court to consider this broader approach. To convict
the defendants in the federal racketeering trial, it was necessary to
prove every element of murder as the crime is spelled out under New
York State law. 120 Applying the "actual evidence" test, the essential
elements which were used by the prosecution during the first trial to
prove murder would be used to prove the essential elements of mur-
der in New York. Therefore, under the actual evidence test, the de-
fendants would have been protected from re-prosecution.
The Polito court was asked whether the defendants were be-
ing improperly prosecuted a second time after the termination of a
previous prosecution in federal court stemming from the "same of-
fense." ' 2' Interpretation of the term "same offense" has led to mas-
116 Id. at 42 n.23.
"1 Id. at 53.
''8 Id. at 54-55.
119 Richardson, 717 N.E.2d at 49-50.
120 Polito, 871 N.E.2d at 540.
121 Id. at 538. The Fifth Amendment does not allow: a subsequent prosecution for the
same offense after acquittal; a subsequent prosecution for the same offense after conviction;
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sive incongruity throughout this nation's courts. 122 There is often un-
certainty as to whether one, or more than one, offense has been com-
mitted for certain activity. Most states adhere to the Blockburger test
by adopting its exact terminology, or something very similar, but as a
result of the inherent difficulties interpreting the terminology, courts
have come up with various methods of their own.123 These other ap-
proaches have been met with both enthusiasm and with sharp opposi-
tion, causing heated debate.
124
The Blockburger test is the standard approach used by courts
in the United States as a guideline for determining whether the "same
offense" was committed. 125  This is commonly referred to as the
"evidence approach."'' 26 This approach has three variations: the re-
quired evidence test, the alleged evidence test, and the actual evi-
dence test. 27 In general, this approach focuses on the evidence ob-
tained by the prosecution and how the legal system is allowed to
utilize such evidence to formulate a case against defendants. 128 An-
other approach is the "behavioral approach," which focuses on the
defendant's acts at the time he is alleged to have committed them to
nor multiple punishments for the same offense.
122 David Mccune, Case Note, United States v. Dixon: What Does "Same Offense" Really
Mean?, 48 ARK. L. REv. 709, 709, 743 (1995) (stating that "[lt]he flexibility with which to
apply Dixon's same conduct approach will be difficult for the lower courts to interpret").
123 Id. See Alex Tsiatsos, Note, Double Jeopardy Law and the Separation of Powers, 109
W. VA. L. REv. 527, 564-70 (2007) (listing each individual states' methodology for deter-
mining whether one, or more than one, offense has been committed for double jeopardy pur-
poses).
124 See, e.g., Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 463-69 (1970) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
125 See Dixon, 509 U.S. at 704.
126 State v. Bolarinho, 850 A.2d 907, 909 (R.I. 2004).
127 United States v. Inmon, 568 F.2d 326, 332 (3d Cir. 1977).
128 Richardson, 717 N.E.2d at 42.
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determine whether they were separate or distinct.1 29 Finally, some
courts use the "same transaction" test which attempts to provide
much greater protection than the other tests.'30
The majority of jurisdictions continue to employ the Block-
burger "required evidence test." 3 ' The Supreme Court has made this
the benchmark for analyzing a "same offense" issue under double
jeopardy.1 32 The Court held that if analysis under the Blockburger
test demonstrates that more than one offense has been committed,
jeopardy has not attached, and the defendant may be tried again.
33
While this test is used in the majority of state courts, and sets forth
the minimal constitutional protection states may afford, it is not the
only test courts may use. 134 As Richardson illustrated, the "actual
evidence" test provides a feasible alternative to Blockburger which
courts use to create uniformity. However, only a minority of jurisdic-
tions employ this approach.
The third variation of the Blockburger test is the "alleged evi-
dence" test, where an offense is the same if there is a "sufficient simi-
larity" between the allegations of each indictment.135 This test falls
somewhere between the "actual" and "required" evidence tests be-
cause preclusion of subsequent indictment turns on whether antici-
129 See id. at 41.
130 See Dixon, 509 U.S. at 709 n.14.
131 See Tsiatsos, supra note 123, at 564-70.
132 Dixon, 509 U.S. at 704.
13 Id. at 700.
134 See, e.g., Erickson v. State, 950 P.2d 580, 582 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997) (holding the
court will decide whether one, or more than one, offense was convicted by looking at the
statutes violated in relation to the crime and decide how society's interest would be best
served); State v. Denton, 938 S.W.2d 373, 381 (Tenn. 1996) (holding that in addition to
Blockburger, each case will be looked at on a case-by-case basis).
135 State v. Gocken, 896 P.2d 1267, 1277 (Wash. 1995) (Johnson, J., dissenting).
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pated evidence is presented. 3 6 However, this test has not garnered
much support.'37 In fact, the "alleged evidence" test has been used so
seldomly, if at all, that "it appears to have fallen into 'deserved des-
uetude' " in courts throughout the country.
138
State v. Schackow' 39 offers yet another methodology. New
Mexico requires courts to undertake a two-part analysis. First, the
defendant's conduct must violate more than one statutory provi-
sion. 140 Then, the court must decide whether the provision's legisla-
tive intent was to punish a defendant for multiple statutory violations
for the offense of which he is accused. 14 1 For the Double Jeopardy
Clause to be implicated, the first prong must be answered positively,
and the second negatively. 142 This method, however, while offering
another innovative approach, is ineffective because it adds to the am-
biguity of Blockburger and effectively gives courts more discretion to
rule on a case-by-case basis, undoubtedly leading to incongruent de-
cisions. Despite the obvious intent to provide a uniform means of
applying the double jeopardy provision, the application demonstrates
an inability to guide courts to consistent outcomes.
Adopted in Grady v. Corbin, the "same conduct" test which
was overruled in Dixon, was used to determine whether one, or more
136 Notes and Comments, Twice in Jeopardy, 72 YALE L.J. 262, 269 n.32 (1965).
137 Richard Finacom, Comment, Successive Prosecutions and the Continuing Criminal
Enterprise: The Double Jeopardy Analysis in Garrett v. United States, 13 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 785, 796 n.82 (1986).
138 Id.
139 143 P.3d 745 (N.M. Ct. App. 2006).
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than one, offense was committed.143 This approach, commonly re-
ferred to as the "behavioral approach," is based upon the defendant's
conduct for each of his charged crimes. The "same conduct" test
bans a subsequent prosecution "if, to establish an essential element of
an offense charged in [the second trial], the government will prove
conduct that constitutes an offense for which the defendant has al-
ready been prosecuted."' 44 A proper analysis under this test requires
the court to assess the conduct itself and determine whether it was the
"same offense," rather than examining the evidence necessary to
prove the conduct. 145 In Corbin, the Supreme Court reasoned that if
Blockburger was the exclusive test, the defendant could be tried sepa-
rately in four consecutive trials.146 In a relatively simple analysis ap-
plying the "same conduct" test, the court held, because the prosecu-
tion would be proving the conduct, from which the defendant was
convicted of traffic offenses, to establish the essential elements of the
homicide and assault offenses, 147 double jeopardy barred the subse-
quent prosecutions. 148 Likewise, in Polito, it appears that applying
the "same conduct" test would have barred any subsequent prosecu-
tion of the defendants. To convict the defendants of murder, the
prosecution would have to prove the requisite conduct: the actual
murder of the men. This is the same conduct that was necessary to
14' Grady, 495 U.S. at 509.
'44 Id. at 510.
145 Id. at 521.
146 Id. at 520. Once each for "failure to keep right of the median, for driving while intoxi-
cated, for assault, and for homicide." Id.
147 The defense conceded that Blockburger did not bar subsequent prosecution of reckless
manslaughter, criminally negligent homicide, and third degree reckless assault. Id. at 522.
141 Grady, 495 U.S. at 510.
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prove the statutory requirement of "murder in the aid of racketeering
activity."
Three years after Grady, the Supreme Court revisited the is-
sue in Dixon. The Court overruled Grady, holding the Blockburger
test as the benchmark test for double jeopardy purposes, for deter-
mining whether there have been multiple punishments for a single of-
fense. 149 While not purporting to hold the "same conduct" test un-
constitutional, the Court noted that it is not required to analyze such
situations using both the Blockburger and "same conduct" test.
150
The overruling of Grady three years after its decision illustrates the
extent of the difficulties courts have with the issue. In fact, there was
heated discussion over the way with which precedent was dealt
with.1" '
Another, more liberal, approach stems from the "same con-
duct" test, and is called the "same transaction" test. 152 This test re-
quires the prosecution to charge all offenses based on one event to-
gether. Justice Brennan was the principle proponent of this more
protective test because the "same evidence" test allows multiple
prosecutions for the same offense. 153 Arguably, the "same conduct"
test is simply too broad because it lacks the essential element of being
definite and specific. 54 In effect, the adoption of the "same transac-
tion" test would require the prosecution to join all the charges from a
149 Dixon, 509 U.S. at 704.
150 Id.
151 See id. at 741 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (stating that he was dismayed how the Court
so "cavalierly" overruled Grady after a mere three years).
152 Id. at 709 n.14 (majority opinion)
15' Ashe, 397 U.S. at 451 (Brennan, J., concurring).
154 Harris v. State, 17 S.E.2d 573, 578 (Ga. 1941).
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single criminal transaction together. 155 However, a major problem
arises because the term "transaction" creates another ambiguity with
which courts must deal with, and the real question courts should face
is whether or not the said acts were the "same offense."
156
The evidence and behavior approaches are the most com-
monly employed methods to determine when conduct constitutes the
"same offense," but the list is by no means all inclusive. Polito dem-
onstrates the need for a uniform approach to determining when dou-
ble jeopardy protects and when it does not. That approach needs to
encompass multiple steps to ensure a more predictable result with
adequate protection.
New York's statutory provisions for interpreting the term
"same offense" are without question broader than those minimally
required by the United States Constitution. 57 However, a uniform
test for determining what constitutes the "same offense" has eluded
federal and state courts alike. If Congress does not fix the punish-
ment for a federal offense clearly and without ambiguity, confusion
concerning the law will continue to exist. 58 Unfortunately, history
has shown that courts have a very difficult time formulating a coher-
ent and applicable test to resolve whether or not the "same offense"
has been committed for double jeopardy purposes. New York at
least, through section 40.20(1) and section 40.20(2) of the CPL, has
provided its citizens with greater protection than that afforded by the
155 See Poulin, supra note 112, at 1240.
156 See George C. Thomas III, A Blameworthy Act Approach to the Double Jeopardy
Same Offense Problem, 83 CAL. L. REv. 1027, 1037 (1995).
157 See People v. Berkowitz, 406 N.E.2d 783, 790 (N.Y. 1980).
158 See Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 84 (1955).
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Federal Constitution. Under subsection one of the statutory provi-
sions, it appears at first blush that New York offers less protection
than what is provided. However, the Polito court correctly reasoned
that the constitutional deficiencies inherent in the statute are over-
come by the limited exceptions in subsection two, which make the
statutory provision as a whole very broad in scope.1
59
The Blockburger evidence test is simply too ambiguous and
gives prosecutors the ability and opportunity to abuse their power in
re-prosecuting the accused, which is "simply intolerable. ' 60 Applied
in practice, Blockburger is so easily circumvented that the notion of
double jeopardy protection is in serious doubt.1 6' In principle, double
jeopardy exists to protect citizens from being twice prosecuted for the
"same offense."' 162 In reality, because of the ambiguity surrounding
the test, it is uncertain whether citizens are actually afforded this pro-
tection.
New York's statutory implementation of its state constitu-
tional double jeopardy prohibition is, in effect, very broad and offers
much more protection than required under the United States Constitu-
tion.163 The Federal Constitution, all ambiguities aside, more than
likely provides greater protection than that of section 40.10(1) and
section 40.20(1). However, as the Polito court reasoned, these stat-
utes do not offend constitutional requirements because section
' Polito, 871 N.E.2dat 541.
160 Ashe, 397 U.S. at 452 (Brennan, J., concurring).
161 See Poulin, supra note 112, at 1214. See also Dixon, 509 U.S. at 749 (Souter, J., dis-
senting) ("Blockburger ... is insufficient... against successive prosecution ....
162 See U.S. CONST. amend. V; N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 6.
163 See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § § 40.10(1), 40.20(1)-(2).
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40.20(2) confers whatever protections section 40.10(1) and section
40.20(1) deny.1" Unless one of the eight exceptions is directly appli-
cable, section 40.20(2) denies multiple prosecutions for multiple of-
fenses based upon the same activity. 65 From the above analysis, it is
clear these exceptions provide more protection than minimally re-
quired by the Federal Constitution and is the reason the New York
statute offers some of the broadest double jeopardy protection in the
United States. 
166
Only one thing is easy to discern about double jeopardy: it is
not easy to enforce uniformly. To be prosecuted and acquitted or
convicted for an act and later face the misfortune of re-prosecution
for another statutory violation stemming from the same act is con-
trary to the protection many citizens believe they possess. Protection
from being subject to prosecution more than once is "a vital safe-
guard and 'a fundamental ideal in our constitutional heritage.' 55167
Courts and legislatures must focus on the shortcomings of the current
system and create effective safeguards. A prosecutor should be re-
quired to bring all possible known or knowable charges, at the time
of the original prosecution, or lose the ability to bring them at all.
Among the evils of a subsequent second prosecution is the prejudice
suffered by the defendant on account of knowledge acquired by
prosecutors who learn from errors made during the first trial. Al-
though this is perhaps an inevitable occurrence in the instance of ap-
164 Polito, 871 N.E.2d 541.
165 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 40.20(2).
166 See Tsiatsos, supra note 123, at 564-70.
167 Booth, 635 N.E.2d at 280 (quoting Benton, 395 U.S. at 794).
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pellate reversal, it is worrisome that crafty prosecutors can take an-
other bite at the apple. If evidence to prosecute a defendant could
have, or reasonably should have, been introduced during the first pro-
ceeding, the prosecution should be barred from again prosecuting a
defendant if the offense for which he is subsequently tried for could
have been introduced at the original trial. Subsequently-discovered
evidence should also be forbidden to ensure the defendant is not har-
assed, further intruding on constitutional protections. 168 Protection
from double jeopardy would be increased by placing the burden on
prosecutors to demonstrate due diligence and ensure justice is served
during the first trial. As it may be, the possibility remains that there
will be some attempt to circumvent the system, but, in the majority of
circumstances, prosecutors will abide by their professional responsi-
bilities and perform ethically. 
169
As courts throughout the country craft new methods to tackle
ambiguities, it is likely some will follow New York's lead and elimi-
nate by statute at least some of the ambiguities that epitomize Block-
burger and its progeny. Regardless, history dictates a strong likeli-
hood that the Supreme Court will review this topic several more
times.
William Pike
168 See, e.g., Justices of Boston Mun. Court v. Lydon, 466 U.S. 294, 307 (1984) (stating
double jeopardy claims should be analyzed under policies ensuring the defendant does not
"live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity"); State v. Currie, 197 A.2d 678, 681
(N.J. 1964) (stating there is no questioning the constitutional protection of double jeopardy
and impermissibility of harassing and oppressing an individual with multiple prosecutions
for the same offense).
169 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 (1980).
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